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Abstract
Recent research on glass ceilings and sticky oors has focused on the magnitude of
di¤erences between groups in the upper and lower quantile cuto¤s of the conditional
wage distribution. However, quantile cuto¤s for di¤erent groups are only weakly infor-
mative of representation. For example, if the top decile cuto¤ is lower for minority than
majority workers, this tells us that minority workers are under-represented in the top
decile, but does not tell us the magnitude of the under-representation. In this paper,
we propose a direct measure of the representation of a population subgroup, which we
dene as the proportion of group members whose earnings lie below (or above) a pop-
ulation earnings quantile. Our representation index is easily generalised to condition
on characteristics (such as age, education, etc). Further, it generalizes naturally to
an index of the severity (or cost) of under-representation to group members, which is
based on dollar-weighted representation. Both representation and severity indices are
easily calculated via existing regression techniques. We illustrate the approach using
Canadian earnings data.
JEL Codes: C1, C44, J71,
Keywords: representation, glass ceiling, discrimination, quantile regression, expec-
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1 Introduction
It is well established that women and some ethnic minorities earn less than comparable white
males (see e.g., Blau and Kahn (2000), Smith and Welch (1989), Pendakur and Pendakur
(2002)). One proposed explanation is that workers in these groups face a glass ceiling
that limits their access to the very best jobs in society. Another possible explanation is the
existence of a sticky oorthat crowds these workers into the very worst jobs in society. Both
of these mechanisms suggest that disadvantaged groups will be under-represented in some
parts of the earnings distribution and over-represented in others. In this paper, we present
a new index to measure the representation of population subgroups in di¤erent parts of the
population-level conditional earnings distribution. Our representation indices shed light on
both the existence and consequences of glass ceilings and sticky oors.
Although the idea of a glass ceiling is widespread, there has been surprisingly little
research by economists to establish its existence or assess its consequences. Recent research
has focused on the magnitude of di¤erences between groups in the upper and lower quantile
cuto¤s of the conditional wage distribution (Fortin and Lemieux (1998), Albrecht et al.
(2003), de la Rica et al. (2005), Kee (2005), Jellal et al. (2006)). For example, Albrecht et al.
(2003) show in their study of Swedish data that the conditional top decile cuto¤ of womens
wages is well below that of men and conclude that women face a glass ceiling. Pendakur and
Pendakur (2006) use similar methods to study the earnings of ethnic minorities in Canada
and nd disparity in the upper and lower quantiles. However, knowing the location of a
particular earnings quantile for di¤erent groups is only weakly informative of representation.
Consider the case where the conditional top decile cuto¤ of earnings is $10,000 lower for
minority than majority workers. This tells us that minority workers are under-represented
in the top decile of the population conditional earnings distribution, but does not tell us the
magnitude of the under-representation.
In this paper, we propose a di¤erent strategy to identify and measure the impact of a
glass ceiling or sticky oor. We dene the representation of a population subgroup (hereafter
group) as the proportion of group members whose earnings lie below (or above) a population
earnings quantile. We say that a group is under-represented in a region of the earnings
distribution if the proportion of the group in that region is smaller than the population
proportion. Conversely, we say that a group is over-represented if the proportion of the
group in that region is larger than the population proportion.
Consider a simple example. Suppose ten percent of the population earns more than
$100,000. We say a group is under-represented in the top decile of the population earnings
distribution if less than ten percent of the group earns more than $100,000. Of course a
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groups representation will depend in part on group memberscharacteristics (e.g., educa-
tion, age, etc.), but we can easily generalize our notion of representation to condition on
characteristics. We can estimate (via quantile regression) the top decile cuto¤ of the popula-
tion earnings distribution, conditional on observable characteristics, and ask what proportion
of a particular groups members earn more than this characteristics-dependent cuto¤. If the
proportion is less than ten percent, we say that the group is under-represented in the top
decile of the conditional earnings distribution.
Of course under-representation can take many forms. Disadvantaged group members
may be clustered close to the quantile cuto¤, or far below it. We therefore augment our
representation measure with an index of the severity (or cost) of under-representation that
weights representation by a function of dollar-distances from a cuto¤.
Our approach has two advantages over comparison of quantile cuto¤s to identify the
presence of a glass ceiling or sticky oor. First, it provides a direct estimate of the mag-
nitude of under-representation. Second, it provides a direct estimate of the cost of under-
representation to the disadvantaged group. Furthermore, both indices are easily calculated
via existing regression techniques.
The paper proceeds as follows. We rst develop a framework for modeling representation,
considering both conditional and unconditional approaches. Then, we examine the severity
of under-representation. Finally, we illustrate the approach using Canadian data.
2 Modeling Representation
Consider the distribution of earnings given a vector of characteristics X: The population
consists of individuals i = 1; :::; N each of whom is member of a group j = 1; :::; J . Let
Nj denote the number of members of group j. Let fj(y;X) represent the joint density of
earnings and characteristics for group j; and denote the population joint density of earnings
and characteristics by f(y;X). The conditional cumulative distribution function (conditional
cdf) of y given X for group j, Fj(yjX), is dened as
Fj(yjX) =
R y
0
fj(y;X)dyR1
0
fj(y;X)dy
: (1)
The  th quantile of y conditional on X for group j, qj( ;X), is the inverse of this conditional
cdf,
qj( ;X) = F
 1
j (jX): (2)
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Here, we have that
Fj(qj( ;X)jX) =
R qj(;X)
0
fj(y;X)dyR1
0
fj(y;X)dy
=  :
Similarly, the  th quantile of y conditional on X for the population, q( ;X), is dened by
F (q( ;X)jX) =
R q(;X)
0
f(y;X)dyR1
0
f(y;X)dy
=  (3)
where F (yjX) is the population conditional cdf.
We dene the conditional representation function, rj( ;X), as the proportion of group j
whose earnings lie below the  th population conditional quantile of y:
rj( ;X) = Fj(q( ;X)jX): (4)
The quantity rj( ;X) depends on X because the joint density of y and X may di¤er between
the groups that comprise the population. If, for some value of X, this quantity exceeds  ,
then at that value of X the group is over-represented in the region below  ; if it is less than
 , then the group is under-represented in that region.
When upper quantiles of the population conditional distribution of y given X are of
primary interest, it may be more intuitive to compare 1   rj( ;X) to 1    . In this way,
we can compare representation above population quantiles rather than below. We will refer
to such measures as abovemeasures, in contrast to the belowmeasures presented in this
section. Typically, it will be convenient to use below measures to study sticky oors and
above measures to study glass ceilings.
The conditional representation functions, rj( ;X) for j = 1; :::; J , in combination with
the population conditional quantile function, q( ;X), completely characterize the joint dis-
tribution of (y;X) for each group j. Thus, the set of functions rj( ;X) and q( ;X) contain
the same information as the set of quantile functions, qj( ;X).
Typically, quantile functions are not computed for all possible values of  ; rather, they are
computed for a sparse grid of  values, or sometimes even just a single value of  . Thus, an
important question is whether we learn more about glass ceilings and group representation in
a region of the earnings distribution from the representation function or quantile function at
a single value of  . We argue that the representation function more directly illuminates the
object of interest. Consider a simple example for a given vector of characteristics X. If the
representation of minority workers in the top decile of earnings is 0.06, then they are under-
represented by 40 percent. Alternately put, there are 40 percent fewer minority workers in
the top decile of earnings than we would expect given their characteristics X: In contrast, if
4
we just use estimated quantiles and nd that minority workers have a top decile cuto¤ that
is $10,000 below that of majority workers, we know that they are under-represented, but we
dont know by how much. The representation function provides direct information on the
object of interest: the degree to which a denable group of individuals is represented in a
region of the conditional earnings distribution.
The fact that rj( ;X) depends on X is desirable. It corresponds to a lack of parametric
assumptions regarding the joint distribution of y andX in each group j. However, this lack of
structure comes at a price. Evaluating the magnitude of rj( ;X) for any particular value of
X is in principle a nonparametric problem that may have a very slow rate of convergence ifX
is high dimensional in its continuous elements (its discrete elements do not a¤ect convergence
rates). Furthermore, because rj( ;X) depends on X; its magnitude for any particular value
of X is not revealing of representation for the group as a whole. A summary statistic based
on averaging rj( ;X) solves both of these problems.
A convenient summary of representation for group j is the average value of rj( ;X) over
all members of the group. By averaging over individuals, we implicitly average over their
characteristics X with weights corresponding to the distribution of characteristics in group
j. We denote this average as rj(); and dene our conditional representation index as
rj() =
1
Nj
X
ij
rj( ;Xi): (5)
The conditional representation index, rj(), is the average representation of group j below
the  th population conditional quantile cuto¤. If rj() exceeds  , then the group as a whole
is over-represented below the  th quantile of the population conditional distribution of y
given X; if it is less than  , then the group as a whole is under-represented in that region.
For any particular value of  , this summary statistic is easily estimated using popular
statistical software (such as R, S+, SAS or Stata) in two steps. First, estimate the population
conditional quantile cuto¤s from the quantile regression of y on X. The population condi-
tional quantile regression function, q( ;X), satises P [yi < q( ;X)] =  . Second, given an
estimate of the population conditional quantile function q^( ;X), construct predicted values
q^( ;Xi) for all i in group j. A sample estimate of the conditional representation index for
group j is given by
r^j() =
1
Nj
X
ij
I [yi < q^( ;Xi)]
where I is the indicator function.
It is natural to ask under what circumstances the conditional representation function
rj ( ;X) is independent of X: That is, when does the conditional representation function
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rj ( ;X) coincide with the conditional representation index rj ()? In fact, there may be
little variation in rj( ;X) over X even if the conditional cdfs, Fj (yjX), di¤er greatly across
groups. This is because representation is invariant to some transformations of the joint
distribution of y and X. The following proposition (proof in the appendix) establishes that
if the conditional quantile functions qj( ;X) have the same shape over X for all j, but
possibly describe di¤erent quantiles for each j, then there is no variation in rj( ;X) over X.
Proposition 1 If j is a monotone increasing mapping from [0; 1] to [0; 1] and
Fj(yjX) = j (F1(yjX)) (6)
for all j = 2; :::; J; then rj( ;X) is independent of X:
3 Accounting for Characteristics
In many instances, it will be of interest to assess the importance of individual characteristics
in determining a groups over- or under-representation in a region of the earnings distribution.
This is easily done by comparing the estimated conditional representation index for group j,
r^j(), to the estimated unconditional representation of group j in the population distribution
of earnings.
The  th unconditional quantile cuto¤ of the population distribution, q(), solves
P [yi < q()] =  :
Let q^() denote a sample estimate of this quantity. Our unconditional representation index
for group j, Rj(), is the proportion of group members whose value of yi lies below the
 th unconditional population quantile cuto¤: Rj() = Fj (q ()), where Fj (y) is the uncon-
ditional cdf of earnings in group j: A sample estimate of the unconditional representation
index for group j is
R^j() =
1
Nj
X
ij
I [yi < q^()] ; (7)
i.e., the sample proportion of group j whose earnings lie below q^ ().
Consider the representation of group j in the bottom decile of the earnings distribution.
The value of r^j(0:10) gives the proportion of the groups members whose earnings are below
the population cuto¤ for the conditional bottom decile, controlling for variation in X. In
contrast, the value of R^j(0:10) gives the proportion of the groups members whose earnings
are below the population cuto¤ for the bottom decile of the unconditional distribution,
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without controlling for variation in X. If, for example, R^j(0:10) = 0:20 and r^j(0:10) = 0:10,
then we say that poor characteristics explain the over-representation of group j in the bottom
decile of earnings. If, on the other hand, R^j(0:10) = 0:20 and r^j(0:10) = 0:15, we say that
poor characteristics do not explain all of the over-representation of group j in the bottom
decile, and that we observe 50% more members of group j in the bottom decile than in the
population as a whole, even after controlling for their characteristics.
4 Severity of Under-Representation
It is natural to ask whether under-representation in a part of the earnings distribution has
large or small consequences. If, for example, minorities are under-represented in the top decile
but over-represented in the top percentile, then the representation index rj(0:90) would be
above 0.90, but minority workers could actually be receiving much of the total earnings in
the upper tail of the distribution. In this case, high representation in the top percentile of
the distribution might mitigate low representation in the top decile.
If we evaluated the representation index at all possible  , we could examine the complete
collection of representation indices. More realistically, however, if we only evaluate the
representation index for a sparse grid on  ; or even a single value of  , then it is desirable
to have some aggregator to supplement the representation index. A natural aggregator of
representation weights the representation below (above) a cuto¤ by (some function of) the
dollar amount of the deviation below (above) the cuto¤. In this section, we develop a severity
index based on this idea that is easily estimated by iteratively re-weighted ordinary least
squares.
The expectile function (see Newey and Powell (1987)) is the solution to a weighted version
of the quantile problem. The population quantile function given by (3) denes a cuto¤ q such
that the proportion of the density of earnings below q is  : In contrast, the expectile function
denes a cuto¤ e( ;X) such that the proportion of the weighted density of earnings below
e( ;X) is  : The weight used in the expectile function is the dollar value of the distance
from the cuto¤. The expectile function, e, is thus dened byR e(;X)
0
je( ;X)  yj f(y;X)dyR1
0
je( ;X)  yj f(y;X)dy =  ; (8)
which simply adds the weight je( ;X)  yj to (3). For further similarities between ordinary
least squares, quantile regression and expectile regression, see Newey and Powell (1987)
(especially footnote 2). For people earnings less than the cuto¤, je( ;X)  yj = e ( ;X)  y
gives the shortfallof earnings below the cuto¤, and for those earning more than the cuto¤,
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je( ;X)   yj = y   e( ;X) gives the surplusof earnings above the cuto¤. The expectile
function denes the cuto¤ value such that the total shortfall is a proportion  of the total
shortfall plus the total surplus. For  = 0:50, the total shortfall equals the total surplus,
which characterizes the mean. Thus expectile regression for  = 0:50 is ordinary mean
regression, computable via ordinary least squares. Expectile regression for other values of 
corresponds to a type of weighted ordinary least squares.
We dene the conditional severity function, sj ( ;X), as the weighted representation
below the population expectile e( ;X), where the weight is the distance je( ;X)  yj. That
is,
sj( ;X) =
R e(;X)
0
je( ;X)  yj fj(y;X)dyR1
0
je( ;X)  yj fj(y;X)dy
: (9)
Note that sj( ;X) =  for all  if and only if fj(y;X) = f(y;X), i.e., if group j has the
same joint distribution of (y;X) as the population as a whole.
We argue that the conditional severity function captures the economic cost, or sever-
ity, of under-representation in two related ways. First, note that the weights increase with
distance from the cuto¤ e ( ;X). Therefore density far below the cuto¤, where the cost of
under-representation is greatest, is given greater weight than density just below the cut-
o¤. If we hold density below the cuto¤ (representation) constant, the conditional severity
function increases as the earnings distribution becomes more concentrated at very low lev-
els of earnings, and decreases as the distribution becomes more concentrated just below the
cuto¤. In contrast, if we hold density above the cuto¤constant, the conditional severity func-
tion decreases as the earnings distribution becomes more concentrated at very high levels
of earnings, because such concentration increases the denominator of the severity function.
Second, the conditional severity function can be interpreted in terms of conditional means
of y: The numerator of (9) is a scaled di¤erence between the expectile cuto¤ e ( ;X) and
the conditional mean of y given X below the cuto¤:R e(;X)
0
je( ;X)  yj fj(y;X)dyR e(;X)
0
fj(y;X)dy
= e( ;X) 
R e(;X)
0
y fj(y;X)dyR e(;X)
0
fj(y;X)dy
= e( ;X)  Ej[yjX; y < e( ;X)]
where Ej denotes the expectation for members of group j. Thus the numerator of (9) is
large if the groups conditional mean of earnings below the cuto¤ is small. The denominator
of (9) simply normalizes the conditional severity function to lie in [0; 1].
Thus our severity measure has a natural metric. For a given X, the severity measure
evaluated on the population as a whole equals  by the denition of the population expectile.
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If sj( ;X) exceeds  , then the dollar-weighted representation of group j below  th population
expectile exceeds the dollar-weighted representation of the population. If sj( ;X) is less than
 , then the dollar-weighted representation of group j below  th population expectile is less
than the dollar-weighted representation of the population.
The conditional severity function can usefully supplement the conditional representation
function. For example, if for a given X, representation for group j in the bottom popula-
tion decile is 0:20, then the proportion of group js members in the bottom decile of the
distribution is twice that of the population as a whole. However, if the earnings of members
of group j are clustered just below the bottom decile cuto¤, then this over-representation
in the lowest decile is not very severe. The conditional severity function would illuminate
such a pattern. In this example, it might be the case that the severity measure for the
10th population expectile is 0:15, which would indicate that when weighted by dollars, the
over-representation in the bottom of the distribution is not as severe as the representation
index might suggest.
In the example above, we considered representation and severity with  = 0:10. Note,
however, that in general the dollar value of the  th population quantile will not be the same as
the dollar value of the  th population expectile. We dene our severity measure based on the
expectile function to give it the natural metric described above. One could alternately dene
a conditional severity function directly from the population conditional quantile function,
for example, as the dollar-weighted representation below q( ;X). However, a conditional
severity function dened in this way would not have a natural metric. In particular, its
value for a group would only be meaningful relative to its value for the population as a
whole.
Like the representation function, the severity function, sj( ;X), depends on X. We
therefore desire a summary measure of severity for group j that averages over X, and dene
a conditional severity index, sj(), as
sj() =
1
Nj
X
ij
sj( ;Xi): (10)
Here, sj() is the average conditional severity for members of group j below the  th popula-
tion expectile cuto¤. If sj() is greater than  , then the earnings of the group are crowded
below the  th population expectile.
Replacing population quantities with sample quantities in (9) and (10) denes a sam-
ple estimate of the conditional severity index, s^j (), based on a population-level esti-
mated expectile regression function. The di¤erences between ordinary least squares re-
gression, quantile regression and expectile regression are most easily understood as a dif-
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ference between the penalty function applied to deviations of yi from a function, f(;Xi),
which depends on parameters  and covariates X. Dening residuals ui = yi   f(;Xi),
all three regression approaches minimize (by choice of ) the sum of penalized residu-
als,
PN
i=1 p (ui). In ordinary least squares, the penalty function is the square function,
p (u) = u2. In quantile regression, the penalty function is the weighted absolute value func-
tion, p (u) = j   I(u < 0)j  juj. In expectile regression, the penalty function is the weighted
square function, p (u) = j   I(u < 0)j  u2. Thus, expectile regression combines features of
quantile regression and mean (OLS) regression.
For any value of  , estimation of the severity index consists of two steps. The rst
step is to iteratively estimate the population expectile function via asymmetrically weighted
least squares (see Newey and Powell (1987)). The iterations are as follows: given a pre-
estimate of the regression function f(;Xi), compute weights j   I(ui < 0)j and estimate
the regression of y onX by weighted least squares (WLS). Then, update the weights using the
new estimates, and re-estimate the model by WLS. This process is repeated to convergence.
Given an estimate e^( ;X) of the population expectile function, the second step is to
construct predicted values e^( ;Xi) for all i in group j; and compute s^j() as the sample
average of weighted representation below e^( ;Xi):
s^j() =
P
ij max fe^( ;Xi)  yi; 0gP
ij je^( ;Xi)  yij
:
We dene an unconditional severity index, Sj(), analogously to the unconditional rep-
resentation index Rj(). A sample estimate of the unconditional  th expectile cuto¤ of the
population distribution, e(), solvesPN
i=1max fe^()  yi; 0gPN
i=1 je^()  yij
= 
for e^(). A sample estimate of the unconditional severity index for group j is
S^j() =
P
ij max fe^()  yi; 0gP
ij je^()  yij
:
As in the case of the representation index, we can compare the conditional severity index
to the unconditional severity index to assess the contribution of individual characteristics to
the severity of under-representation.
We close our discussion of the severity function and index by noting that its value and
interpretation depends on the scale of the outcome variable y: This is in contrast to repre-
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sentation, which is invariant to transformations of y. We point this out because it is typical
in applied labour economics to estimate models where the dependent variable is measured in
logarithms. Indeed, this is the case in our application below. This implies that the weights
should be interpreted as log-dollar distances, or approximately as percentage distances, from
the population expectile cuto¤.
5 Results
We estimate our representation and severity indices on the universe of long form responses
to the 2001 Census of Canada. These are condential data, and we discuss replicability
below. Census long forms are administered to twenty percent of Canadian households, with
the exception of households on Aboriginal reserves that are sampled at a 100 percent rate.
All reported estimates are computed using sample weights provided by Statistics Canada.1
We dene three broad ethnic categories of interest: Aboriginal, visible minority and white.
These categories correspond to those used in Canadian Employment Equity policy. A person
is classied as Aboriginal if their self-reported ancestry includes Aboriginal, Métis, Inuit, or
North American Indian. A person is classied as visible minority if they are not Aboriginal,
and their self-reported ancestry includes any region other than Canada, the United States,
Europe, Israel, Australia or New Zealand. All others are classied as white.
Our focus is on the native-born population, and our primary interest is on non-white
ethnic minorities. We focus on the native-born population to eliminate the potentially con-
founding e¤ects of immigration on the earnings distribution. Canadian-born visible minori-
ties comprise less than 2 percent of the Canadian-born population, and Aboriginals comprise
less than 3 percent. Estimation and inference therefore requires a large sample, so the uni-
verse of long form Census responses is ideally suited to this investigation. Our analysis
sample consists of all Canadian-born residents of Canada, 25 to 64 years of age, whose pri-
mary source of income is from wages and salaries, and who report positive schooling and
earnings.
We base the representation and severity indices on a frequently used measure of labor
earnings: the natural logarithm of annual gross earnings from wages and salaries. The
conditional indices control for age (8 categories), schooling (13 categories), marital status
(5 categories), household size, o¢ cial language knowledge (3 categories), and 12 area-of-
residence categories comprised of 10 Census Metro Areas (CMAs), a small CMA identier,
and a non-CMA identier.
1Sample weights are constructed to replicate population counts by age, sex, marital status, mother tongue,
and household composition. See Statistics Canada (2003) for details.
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Although Statistics Canada guidelines do not allow release of the exact counts of popula-
tion groups in our analysis, our analysis sample contains approximately 900,000 observations
each for men and women. In the interest of replicability, we present estimates based on the
Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) of the 2001 Census of Canada in the appendix. We do
not report estimates from the PUMF in the body of the paper because the PUMF has far
fewer observations than the (condential) database that we use. Appendix Table 1 reports
sample means in the PUMF, subject to the sample restrictions dened above. Weighted
sample means in our analysis sample match those in Appendix Table 1 to at least two dec-
imal places. The sample statistics contain no surprises. There is considerable dispersion in
earnings across demographic groups: the average earnings of men exceed those of women,
and the average earnings of whites exceed those of visible minorities and Aboriginal persons.
Table 1 presents estimates of the conditional and unconditional representation index
at the tenth, ftieth, and ninetieth percentile of log earnings. At each of these quantiles,
the representation of white men and women corresponds very closely to that of the entire
native-born population. This is unsurprising, given that white men and women comprise
over 95 percent of the native-born population. However, Aboriginals and visible minorities
are heavily over-represented below the tenth and ftieth percentiles, and under-represented
above the ninetieth percentile. In general, the magnitude of the representation index is more
extreme for Aboriginals than visible minorities, and interestingly, is more extreme for men
than for women. Recall that the indices in this paper are all presented as belowmeasures,
but can be characterised as abovemeasures by subtracting them from 1. In our discussion
below, we will focus mainly on the top and bottom deciles, and will discuss bottom decile
results with below measures in mind, and upper decile results with above measures in mind.
We begin a closer inspection of Table 1 with the least extreme group, female visible
minorities. Compared to the population of women, visible minority women are uncondition-
ally over-represented by almost 50 percent in the bottom decile of log earnings (R^j (0:10) =
0:149), and under-represented by nearly 20 percent in the top decile (R^j (0:90) = 0:919).
However, these values are almost completely explained by the characteristics of group mem-
bers (r^j (0:10) = 0:104; r^j (0:90) = 0:904).
Among men, visible minorities are quite heavily over-represented in the lower tail of the
distribution and under-represented in the upper tail: unconditionally, there are fully 2.26
times more male visible minorities below the tenth percentile of log earnings (R^j (0:10) =
0:226), and 41 percent fewer above the ninetieth percentile, than in the population (R^j (0:90) =
0:941). This is largely, but not completely, explained by their characteristics. Controlling for
individual characteristics reduces the representation index at the tenth percentile to 0.129,
and at the ninetieth percentile to 0.924. These results suggest that male visible minorities
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face not only a glass ceiling that limits their opportunities at the top of the earnings distri-
bution, but also a sticky oor that limits their advancement beyond the lowest-paying jobs
in society.
Among both men and women, Aboriginals fare worse than visible minorities. Uncondi-
tionally, Aboriginal women are over-represented by 86 percent in the bottom decile of log
earnings and under-represented by 58 percent in the top decile. The situation is even bleaker
for Aboriginal men, more than 70 percent of whom earn less than the median log earnings
of all native-born men. They are over-represented by 119 percent in the bottom decile and
under-represented by 66 percent in the top decile. Accounting for characteristics explains
about half of the disparity for women, but little of the disparity for men. Controlling for
individual characteristics, Aboriginal women remain over-represented in the bottom decile
by 42 percent, and under-represented in the top decile by 18 percent. Likewise, Aboriginal
men remain over-represented by 102 percent in the bottom decile, and under-represented by
33 percent in the top decile. Even after controlling for characteristics, nearly 66 percent of
Aboriginal men earn less than the median. We take these results as strong evidence that
Aboriginal men and women face a substantial glass ceiling, and an even more substantial
sticky oor.
Table 2 presents estimates of the severity index. For most groups, they tell a qualitatively
similar story to that of the representation index. However, we see that the representation
index substantially understates the impact of the glass ceiling and sticky oor for Aborig-
inal men. For this group, the severity index at the mean, S^j (0:50), is 0:856. Weighted
by (log-earnings) distance from the mean, the representation of Aboriginal men below the
0:50 expectile the mean is far higher than the population of native-born men. Indeed,
weighting by distance paints a more dismal picture than considering (unweighted) represen-
tation below the median of log earnings, bRj (0:50) = 0:732. This is because the earnings of
Aboriginal men are concentrated in the lowest part of the log earnings distribution.
The severity of over-representation below the mean is substantially reduced when one
accounts for the characteristics of Aboriginal males. The conditional severity index at the
mean, bsj (0:50), is 0:731, which is 0:125 lower than the unconditional severity index. This
remains very large, however, as we can see from the corresponding above measure. Even con-
trolling for characteristics leaves the weighted representation (that is, severity) of Aboriginal
men above the conditional mean at approximately half of that of all native-born men.
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6 Conclusion
The representation index provides an intuitive and easily computed measure of a groups
representation in a region of the earnings distribution. The index may be formulated to
condition on observable characteristics, or not. We augment the representation index with a
severity index that weights representation by the distance from the quantile cuto¤of interest,
and so provides a measure of the economic cost, or severity, of under-representation to the
under-represented group. In conjunction, the representation and severity indices provide
a comprehensive picture of under- and over-representation and its economic consequences.
They represent an important addition to the toolkit of applied researchers studying glass
ceiling and sticky oor phenomena.
In our application to Canadian data, we nd strong evidence that Aboriginals and visible
minorities are under-represented in the conditional upper decile of the population earnings
distribution, and are over-represented in the conditional lower decile of the population earn-
ings distribution. This suggests that these groups face both glass ceilings and sticky oors.
7 Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. In equation (6), j maps the conditional cumulative distribution
of y given X from group to group. Since the quantile cuto¤ function, qj, is the inverse of Fj,
an implication of (6) is
Fj(q1( ;X)jX) = j()
which is independent of X. If, for example, 2(0:5) = 0:6, this implies that the median
earnings for group 1 is the 60th percentile of earnings for group 2 at all values of X. The
restriction (6) ensures that the  th quantile of y conditional on X for the population has the
same shape as some quantile for any group in the population.
Let j  Nj=N denote the proportion of the population that belongs to group j, so thatPJ
j=1 j = 1. Given the restriction (6), the population-level quantiles are implicitly dened
by
JX
j=1
jj (F1(q( ;X)jX)) =  :
Since the left-hand side is a weighted sum of monotone increasing functions of a single
argument F1(q( ;X)jX), it is invertible with respect to this argument, and there must exist
a monotone increasing function 1 such that
F1(q( ;X)jX) = 1():
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Here, 1 is similar to j for j = 2; :::; J , in that it is independent of X, but di¤ers in that 1
maps from the population-level quantiles into the conditional cdf of group 1.
The representation of group j is then given by
Fj(q( ;X)jX) = j(1())
and it is independent of X.
8 Appendix: Replicability
In the interest of replicability, we estimate the representation and severity indices on the
Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) of the 2001 Census of Canada. These are presented
in Appendix Tables 2 and 3. The conditional measures correspond very closely to those
obtained on the universe of long form responses (Tables 1 and 2). However, there are
notable discrepancies between the unconditional representation and severity estimates in the
PUMF and the universe data. This is to be expected, given the nature of the sample weights
in the two les (all our estimates are computed using sample weights provided by Statistics
Canada). In particular, the sample weights are designed to match population counts by age,
sex, marital status, mother tongue, and household composition (see Statistics Canada (2003)
for details). However, they do not directly depend on the distribution of earnings. Thus
we observe signicant di¤erences in the unconditional estimates, but this di¤erence vanishes
when we condition on age, sex, marital status, mother tongue, and household composition.2
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τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9
Women
White 0.098 0.494 0.901 0.098 0.497 0.897
Visible Minorities 0.149 0.559 0.919 0.104 0.507 0.904
Aboriginal Persons 0.186 0.643 0.958 0.142 0.560 0.918
Men
White 0.099 0.489 0.898 0.096 0.493 0.896
Visible Minorities 0.226 0.672 0.941 0.129 0.555 0.924
Aboriginal Persons 0.219 0.705 0.966 0.202 0.656 0.933
Source: Author's calculations based on all long form responses to the 2001 Census of Canada. Simulated standard errors are
available on request.  All standard errors are less than 0.002.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9
Women
White 0.095 0.488 0.895 0.098 0.495 0.898
Visible Minorities 0.153 0.615 0.929 0.117 0.531 0.913
Aboriginal Persons 0.242 0.747 0.971 0.156 0.615 0.932
Men
White 0.093 0.479 0.893 0.096 0.488 0.896
Visible Minorities 0.231 0.743 0.958 0.138 0.594 0.936
Aboriginal Persons 0.334 0.856 0.986 0.224 0.731 0.957
Source: Author's calculations based on all long form responses to the 2001 Census of Canada. Simulated standard errors are
available on request.  All standard errors are less than 0.001.
Unconditional Conditional 
Representation Index for Selected Demographic Groups 
Table 1
Unconditional 
Table 2
Severity Index for Selected Demographic Groups 
Conditional 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
ln(Earnings)
White 10.4 0.96 9.92 1.07
Visible Minorities 10.3 1.08 10.0 1.15
Aboriginal Persons 9.86 1.22 9.52 1.27
Age (years) 41.2 9.86 41.0 9.64
Number of household members 3.01 1.33 2.98 1.29
Single-person household (percent in category)
Ethnicity (column percent in category)
White
Visible Minorities
Aboriginal Persons
Knowledge of Official Languages (column percent in category)
English only
French only
Both English and French
Highest level of educational attainment (column percent in category)
Less than grade 5
Ggrades 5 to 8
Grades 9 to 13
High school graduate
Trades certificate or diploma
College, without college or trades certificate or diploma
College, with trades certificate or diploma
College, with college certificate or diploma
University, without college certificate, diploma, or degree
University, with certicate/diploma below bachelor level
University, with bachelor or first professional degree
University, with university certificate above bachelor level
University, with master's degree[s]
University, with earned doctorate
Marital Status (column percent in category)
Single. never married
Married, including common-law
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Region of Residence (column percent in category)
Montreal
Toronto
Vancouver
All other Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs)
Not in a CMA
Number of Observations
Source: Author's calculations based on the Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) of the 2001 Census of Canada. 
118,203 114,682
63.9
13.8
22.3
64.5
12.5
23.0
16.3
70.1
3.79
8.24
1.65
12.2
31.7
41.1
31.5
40.5
10.2
5.13
10.6
5.16
11.9
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95.5
1.63
2.90
95.4
1.65
2.91
0.39
12.2 11.0
2.68
5.10
20.3
71.5
15.3
2.54
3.14
0.32
6.20
20.3
3.21
8.38
12.7
16.0
2.95
6.75
12.9
1.70
3.51
0.63
11.8
13.8
3.59
6.38
16.2
14.1
5.42
6.40
Men Women
0.50
3.22
0.28
1.87
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9
Women
White 0.098 0.501 0.899 0.098 0.497 0.900
Visible Minorities 0.093 0.450 0.883 0.107 0.522 0.898
Aboriginal Persons 0.179 0.668 0.954 0.140 0.562 0.908
Men
White 0.098 0.511 0.898 0.096 0.494 0.898
Visible Minorities 0.145 0.592 0.910 0.126 0.562 0.930
Aboriginal Persons 0.254 0.732 0.964 0.202 0.664 0.928
Source: Author's calculations based on the Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) of the 2001 Census of Canada. Simulated 
standard errors are available on request.  All standard errors are less than 0.006.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9
Women
White 0.097 0.493 0.898 0.098 0.496 0.899
Visible Minorities 0.102 0.454 0.873 0.124 0.535 0.904
Aboriginal Persons 0.212 0.725 0.964 0.142 0.594 0.922
Men
White 0.094 0.485 0.895 0.095 0.488 0.897
Visible Minorities 0.146 0.609 0.927 0.142 0.602 0.937
Aboriginal Persons 0.292 0.813 0.979 0.232 0.739 0.956
Source: Author's calculations based on the Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) of the 2001 Census of Canada. Simulated 
standard errors are available on request.  All standard errors are less than 0.003.
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